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Abstract  5 
The ‘Major Transitions in Evolution’ (MTE) framework has emerged as the dominant paradigm 6 
for understanding the origins of life's hierarchical organization, but it has been criticized on the 7 
grounds that it lacks theoretical unity, that is, that the events that make up the category do not 8 
constitute a natural kind. I agree with this criticism, and I argue that the best response is to modify 9 
the category so that it does approximate a natural kind. Specifically, I recommend defining major 10 
transitions as all those, and only those, events and processes that result in the emergence of a new 11 
level of selection. Two sorts of changes will be required to achieve this. First, events and processes 12 
that do not meet this criterion, such as the origins of the genetic code and of human language, 13 
should be excluded. Second, events and processes that do meet the criterion, but which have 14 
generally been neglected, should be included. These changes would have the dual benefits of 15 
making MTEs a philosophically coherent category and of increasing the sample size on which we 16 
may infer trends and general principles that may apply to all MTEs. 17 
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Introduction 20 
I grew up thinking that Pluto was a planet. In 2006, however, the International Astronomical Union 21 
formally defined the word “planet" (International Astronomical Union 2006a), and because it had 22 
failed to “clear the neighborhood" around its orbit, Pluto didn't make the cut (International 23 
Astronomical Union 2006b). As a result, textbooks will have to be revised, posters redesigned, 24 
museum displays rebuilt...there are real economic costs to this change. Why, then, did they do it? 25 
Pluto has changed little since its discovery in 1930. Why couldn't the IAU leave well enough 26 
alone? 27 
 28 
 Humans classify the things we observe. We all agree that celestial bodies, biological 29 
organisms, and musical compositions should be sorted into categories, taxa, or genres, but why? 30 
One reason is that we think there is value in grouping like things, because doing so allows us to 31 
make generalizations. Mammals are warm-blooded and produce milk. Rockabilly combines 32 
elements of blues and country music. Planets are roundish, orbit the sun, and clear the 33 
neighborhood around their orbit (International Astronomical Union 2006a). Generalizing, in turn, 34 
allows us to ask questions about the group as a whole, with some hope that the answers will apply 35 
to all of its members. Why are mammals warm-blooded? Who were the pioneers of rockabilly? 36 
How do planets form? 37 
 38 
 As we discover more things, or more properties of known things, sometimes we have to 39 
reconsider the boundaries of a category. Classifications that we thought were discrete and 40 
unambiguous turn out to grade into each other and to include marginal cases, requiring refinement 41 
or revision of the criteria for inclusion. The discovery of monotremes, for example, required 42 
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removing live birth from the criteria for mammals. The discovery of over 1000 Trans-Neptunian 43 
Objects required refining the criteria for planets (International Astronomical Union 2006a).  44 
Genre-straddling musicians spark debates over, for example, whether Lil Nas X's “Old Town 45 
Road" should be ranked on country music charts (Leight 2019). 46 
 47 
 The reason, in a nutshell, that the IAU couldn't leave well enough alone is that the existing 48 
classification would have identified all of the trans-Neptunian Objects as planets, and there was 49 
no way short of blatant gerrymandering to change the definition to exclude them but include Pluto. 50 
So why not just include all of the Trans-Neptunian Objects? Celestial bodies that fail to clear their 51 
orbital neighborhoods differ from planets in both their mechanisms of formation and their roles in 52 
the orbital mechanics of the solar system. Classifying bodies as planets is useful because it allows 53 
us to generalize about these mechanisms and roles and to have some confidence that our 54 
generalizations will be true for all planets, including extrasolar planets. Including trans-Neptunian 55 
Objects that fail to clear their orbital neighborhoods would invalidate some of these 56 
generalizations, making the classification less useful. 57 
 58 
 One of the classifications that has proved useful in biology is that of the so-called ‘Major 59 
Transitions in Evolution’ (MTE). The MTE framework is an attempt to explain the hierarchical 60 
structure of life on Earth: genes within chromosomes, chromosomes within cells, cells within cells 61 
(eukaryotic cells), individuals within sexual partnerships, cells within multicellular organisms, and 62 
organisms within societies.  63 
 64 
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 The best-known effort to unify the origins of these relationships is a book by John Maynard 65 
Smith and Eörs Szathmáry, The Major Transitions in Evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 66 
1995). First published in 1995, the book focused on the origins of these hierarchical levels, uniting 67 
them into a category based on the shared criteria that they change “the way in which genetic 68 
information is transmitted between generations,” and that “…entities that were capable of 69 
independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it.” 70 
For example, after a transition from unicellular to multicellular organisms (there have been 71 
several), cellular reproduction either contributes to the growth of the organism or to production of 72 
new multicellular organisms. 73 
 74 
 Rick Michod has revised this idea, focusing less on reproduction and more on units of 75 
fitness (Michod and Roze 1997; Michod 1999, 2005). An edited volume intended to update the 76 
Major Transitions framework, including chapters by Szathmáry (Szathmáry and Fernando 2011) 77 
and Michod (Michod 2011) was published in 2011. More recently, Szathmáry (2015) himself has 78 
updated the framework he developed with Maynard Smith, removing sex from the list, adding 79 
endosymbiotic events, and folding in David Queller’s (1997) fraternal/egalitarian distinction.  80 
 81 
 Thus, the MTE framework has itself evolved, diversifying into several different versions 82 
that nevertheless retain some ancestral characters. I will briefly review these variants, focusing on 83 
the plesiomorphies that unite them and the apomorphies that distinguish them. I will argue that the 84 
most useful definition of an MTE is ‘an evolutionary change that gives rise to a new level of 85 
selection,’ and I will discuss the ambiguities that follow from this definition. I will explore the 86 
practical implications of applying this definition and explore ambiguous cases near the margins. 87 
 5 
Finally, I will address some of the objections that have been raised, or that I expect to be raised, to 88 
the course I advocate. 89 
 90 
The radiation of frameworks 91 
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's Major Transitions framework was foreshadowed by a long 92 
tradition of viewing life as hierarchically organized and, in some cases, of viewing more inclusive 93 
units as having evolved from less inclusive units. August Weismann, for example, recognized that 94 
multicellular organisms had evolved from unicellular (Weismann 1889), and further postulated 95 
that cells were made up of groups of molecules that he called biophors (Weismann 1893). 96 
Similarly, Herbert Spencer argued that cells must consist of subcellular components he called 97 
physiological units, which were formed by “further compounding of highly compound molecules" 98 
(Spencer 1910, p. 226). William Morton Wheeler extended the hierarchy to include societies of 99 
social insects and of humans, both of which he considered real organisms (Wheeler 1911). John 100 
Tyler Bonner wrote of “leaps from one level of complexity to the next," including the origins of 101 
life, of eukaryotes, of multicellularity, and of sociality (Table 1) (Bonner 1974). Leo Buss 102 
interpreted the hierarchy of life as one of increasingly inclusive units of selection (see quote above) 103 
— “species composed of populations, populations of individuals, individuals of cells, cells of 104 
organelles, organelles of genomes, genomes of chromosomes, and chromosomes of gene," — and 105 
he proposed an evolutionary mechanism for its origin (Table 1) (Buss 1987, pp. 183–184). 106 
 107 
 The first comprehensive effort to understand these transitions within a unified framework, 108 
though, was Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's 1995 book The Major Transitions in Evolution 109 
(Table 1) (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995). This book, and an accompanying paper in Nature 110 
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(Szathmáry and Maynard Smith 1995), attempted to explain the existence of biological units with 111 
different levels of complexity as the result of a series of events in which existing units became 112 
integrated into new, higher-level units. The most important feature of these events was that 113 
“entities that were capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as 114 
part of a larger whole after it" (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995, p. 4). Other important features 115 
included division of labor among the lower-level units and changes in the way information is 116 
transmitted. 117 
 118 
 In his review of The Major Transitions in Evolution, David Queller observed that Maynard 119 
Smith and Szathmáry's framework included two distinct sorts of transitions, with different initial 120 
advantages and eventual outcomes (Queller 1997). Fraternal transitions occur among genetically 121 
similar units, such as the cells in a multicellular organism or the ants in a colony, and a reproductive 122 
division of labor can evolve through kin selection. Egalitarian transitions involve unlike or 123 
unrelated units, such as the Archaean and bacterium that combined to form the eukaryotic cell, and 124 
although both partners benefit from the alliance, both retain the ability to reproduce. 125 
 126 
 Richard Michod has focused on the subset of the major transitions that, in his view, result 127 
in a new unit of selection, including those “from individual genes to networks of genes, from gene 128 
networks to bacteria-like cells, from bacteria-like cells to eukaryotic cells with organelles, from 129 
cells to multicellular organisms, and from solitary organisms to societies" (Table 1) (Michod 1999, 130 
p. 7). His more recent works also include the origins of sexual reproduction (Michod 2011). 131 
Michod's focus on units of selection is consistent with the view of Buss (1987) but narrower than 132 
that of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, who acknowledged that some, but not all, of their major 133 
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transitions involved a change in the units of evolution; for example, the origin of the genetic code 134 
does not fit this scheme (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995). In accordance with this narrower 135 
focus, Michod prefers to call the transitions in his framework evolutionary transitions in 136 
individuality rather than major transitions (Michod and Roze 1997; Michod 1999, 2005, 2011). 137 
 138 
 In 2011, Brett Calcott and Kim Sterelny published an edited volume, The Major 139 
Transitions in Evolution Revisited, with a diverse set of perspectives (Calcott et al. 2011). Several 140 
of the authors accepted Michod's view either explicitly or implicitly, by only considering the subset 141 
of the major transitions that are also transitions in individuality (Godfrey-Smith 2011; Michod 142 
2011; Simpson 2011). Others advocated expanding the framework to include, for example, the 143 
endosymbiotic origins of plastids (Kerr and Nahum 2011), the Cambrian explosion (Calcott and 144 
Sterelny 2011), the mutualistic association between corals and zooxanthellae (Kerr and Nahum 145 
2011), and other evolutionary innovations within the metazoa (Szathmáry and Fernando 2011). 146 
 147 
 Twenty years after the publication of The Major Transitions in Evolution, Szathmáry 148 
revisited the topic, presenting his conception for a “Major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0" 149 
(Table 1) (Szathmáry 2015). He advocated two major changes: the removal of sex and the inclusion 150 
of plastid acquisition. Sex, he argued, was best viewed not as a separate major transition, but “as 151 
a coevolving form of maintenance or transformation of an emerging higher-level evolutionary 152 
unit," namely the eukaryotic cell (Szathmáry 2015, p. 10108). Since plastids are now understood 153 
to result from endosymbiotic events analogous to the acquisition of the mitochondrion, Szathmáry 154 
argued for the inclusion of both primary and recursive (secondary, tertiary, and quaternary) plastid 155 
acquisition events within the major transitions framework.  156 
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 157 
Table 1. A partial list of versions of the major transitions or transitions in individuality framework. 158 
This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, but a sampling of works that have attempted to 159 
present or revise a framework for the evolution of life's hierarchical structure (Bonner 1974; Buss 160 
1987; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Bourke 2011; Michod 2011; Szathmáry 2015; West 161 
et al. 2015). 162 
Origin of... 
Bonner 
1974 
Buss 
1987 
Maynard 
Smith & 
Szathmáry 
1995 
Michod 
2011 
Bourke 
2011 
Szathmáry 
2015 
West 
et al. 
2015 
This 
work 
Eukaryotes X X X X X X X X 
Multicellularity X X X X X X X X 
Eusociality X X X X X X X X 
Protocells/life X X X X X X  X 
Chromosomes  X X X  X X X 
Sex   X X X    
Language/memes  X X   X   
Genetic code   X   X   
Plastids      X X X 
Mutualisms     X  X X 
Colonial animals  X   X   X 
 163 
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Natural kinds 164 
There is something philosophically muddled and scientifically casual about [the major 165 
transitions framework]...The fault has been the yielding to theoretical inconsistency. 166 
Enough is enough. (McShea and Simpson 2011, p. 32) 167 
From the beginning, the major transitions framework has been criticized for lumping together 168 
dissimilar events. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry acknowledged that their list was somewhat 169 
arbitrary (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995), and Queller, in his review of The Major 170 
Transitions, suggested that it was really two books, one describing changes in the mechanisms of 171 
inheritance and one addressing the evolution of cooperation (Queller 1997). In their chapter in The 172 
Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited, Daniel McShea and Carl Simpson argued that Maynard 173 
Smith and Szathmáry's list of major transitions lacks theoretical unity and needs to be revised 174 
(McShea and Simpson 2011). Michod, in the same volume, defended his shorter list of transitions 175 
in individuality on the grounds that, unlike Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's list, his constituted a 176 
natural kind (a category whose members share fundamental similarities) (Michod 2011). More 177 
recently, O’Malley and Powell pointed out that both the original and revised forms of the major 178 
transitions framework fail as natural kinds, shoehorning in events that fail to meet any common 179 
set of criteria and failing to include some events that do (O’Malley and Powell 2016). 180 
 181 
 I agree with McShea and Simpson: enough is enough. To be most useful, the MTE 182 
framework should be modified so that the events and processes included approximate a natural 183 
kind. As the IAU did with planets, we should define the qualifications, then include or exclude 184 
particular examples based on the degree to which those qualifications are met. The criterion that 185 
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comes closest to current and historical usage is ‘an evolutionary change that gives rise to a new 186 
level of selection,' in other words to a new kind of evolutionary individual.  187 
  188 
 There are a large number of different conceptions of what constitutes a biological 189 
individual, far too many to review here. Since the MTE framework, in any version, is a set of 190 
questions about evolutionary processes, the most relevant concept of individuality is an 191 
evolutionary one. The concept of individuality that has been embraced by most MTE authors is 192 
that of units of selection (Lewontin 1970; Hull 1981). Buss (1987), Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 193 
(1995), Michod (Michod and Roze 1997),  Szathmáry (2015), and West and colleagues (2015), 194 
among many others, have all employed some form of this criterion.  195 
 196 
 Treating MTEs as the emergence of new levels of selection is consistent with Bonner's 197 
(1974) "levels of complexity" and with Buss's "transitions between units of selection" (Buss 1987, 198 
p. viii). Although it does not apply to all of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's transitions (as they 199 
acknowledge), it does apply to those that meet the criterion they considered most important, the 200 
shift from independent to group replication (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995) and is consistent 201 
with Maynard Smith's earlier work on the topic (Maynard Smith 1988). It is also the criterion 202 
explicitly advocated by Michod and colleagues (Michod and Roze 1997; Michod 1999, 2005, 203 
2011) and by West and colleagues (2015). Even Szathmáry seems to have recently come around 204 
to viewing major transitions as transitions in the units of selection (Czégel et al. 2019). 205 
 206 
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Ambiguities 207 
We designate something as an organism, not because it is n steps up on the ladder of life, 208 
but because it is a consolidated unit of design, the focal point where lines of adaptation 209 
converge. It is where history has conspired to make between-unit selection efficacious and 210 
within-unit selection impotent.  (Queller 1997, p. 187) 211 
I do not imagine or intend that this essay will end disagreements about what processes belong in 212 
the MTE framework. I have advocated for an explicit criterion—those that result in a new level of 213 
selection—but that, of course, raises a new problem: what constitutes a new level of selection? 214 
What I have in mind is something like Peter Godfrey-Smith's conception of a Darwinian 215 
population (Godfrey-Smith 2009). A level of selection, then, is a population that is capable, 216 
because its members possess heritable variation in fitness (Lewontin 1970), of evolving due to 217 
natural selection. Evolutionary, or Darwinian, individuals are members of such populations, or 218 
units of selection. A major transition occurs when a new kind of entity emerges with heritable 219 
variation in fitness, that is, when a new Darwinian population emerges through interactions among 220 
previously existing individuals. 221 
 222 
 Godfrey-Smith's account of Darwinian populations is, of course, much more thorough and 223 
cogent than this short summary. It recognizes multiple dimensions that contribute to the ability of 224 
a population to respond to selection, it emphasizes that all of them, and as a result individuality 225 
itself, come in degrees, and it acknowledges that some degree of individuality can simultaneously 226 
exist at multiple levels. Its concept of individuality is thus well suited to examining major 227 
transitions, during which intermediate degrees of individuality exist at multiple levels of 228 
organization. 229 
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 230 
 Even if we agree that a major transition is an evolutionary process that results in a new 231 
population of evolutionary individuals, we will still be left with marginal cases. Because 232 
individuality comes in degrees, any line we draw will necessarily be arbitrary (Pepper and Herron 233 
2008; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Herron et al. 2013). In fact, since most such transitions probably play 234 
out over geological time scales, while we can generally only see a snapshot, we should expect to 235 
see many incomplete transitions at any given time. These may be on their way to a complete 236 
transition, or they may be stable arrangements in their own right (Herron et al. 2013). My goal is 237 
not to identify the at which a major transition should be considered complete, but rather to identify 238 
the sorts of processes that should be considered within the MTE framework. 239 
 240 
 Intermediate cases, in which a new level of selection has partially or debatably emerged, 241 
should be part of the MTE conversation. They are our best window into the processes and 242 
intermediate states that occur during a major transition. When we look at only the ends of a 243 
spectrum, we may miss the middle, which is where the interesting stuff is happening. 244 
 245 
What to leave out 246 
For it to be useful to study transitions as a group, there is a need for conceptual unity. 247 
Without conceptual unity, they may as well be grouped together under the heading ‘a list 248 
of interesting and important events in the history of life’. (Ågren 2014, p. 91) 249 
Having chosen a criterion, we should apply it consistently. Two kinds of changes will be needed. 250 
First, events and processes that don't fit the criterion of resulting in a new level of selection should 251 
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be ruthlessly pruned. The most obvious candidate for expulsion is the origin of the genetic code. 252 
The fact that this transition is rarely discussed in the MTE framework constitutes an implicit 253 
acknowledgement of its poor fit, and various authors have pointed out explicitly that it does not 254 
belong (Michod 2011; Ågren 2014; West et al. 2015; O’Malley and Powell 2016). Similarly, the 255 
origin of language has been largely absent from discussions of major transitions, and several 256 
authors have argued that it should be excluded for the sake of theoretical consistency (McShea and 257 
Simpson 2011; Michod 2011; West et al. 2015; O’Malley and Powell 2016). Neither innovation 258 
meets what Maynard Smith and Szathmáry themselves identify as their most important criterion, 259 
the shift from independent to group replication, and neither results in a new level of selection. Two 260 
of these things are not like the others; let us follow the IAU's example and excise that which does 261 
not belong.  262 
 263 
 Surprisingly, several recent proposals have gone the opposite direction. Various 264 
modifications have been proposed that would, if implemented, exacerbate the lack of theoretical 265 
unity by adding events that have very little in common with the transitions traditionally included 266 
within the MTE framework. Proposed additions include the origin of oxygenic photosynthesis and 267 
the resulting oxygenation of the Earth's atmosphere (Szathmáry and Fernando 2011; O’Malley and 268 
Powell 2016); the origin of a nervous system in animals (Jablonka and Lamb 2006); the Cambrian 269 
Explosion (Calcott and Sterelny 2011); the origin of closed circulation systems in vertebrates, 270 
annelids, and cephalopods (Szathmáry and Fernando 2011); the origin of a rigid cell wall 271 
(Szathmáry and Fernando 2011); the origin of an exoskeleton in Ecdysozoa (Szathmáry and 272 
Fernando 2011); and the origin of the immune system (Szathmáry and Fernando 2011). 273 
 274 
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 All of these proposed additions are undoubtedly important evolutionary events, but none 275 
of them belong in the MTE framework. They don't meet Buss's criteria of transitions between units 276 
of selection (Buss 1987), Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's of independently replicating entities 277 
shifting to group replication (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995), or Michod's of the emergence 278 
of new evolutionary individuals (Michod and Roze 1997; Michod 1999, 2005, 2011). Adding the 279 
origins photosynthesis, nervous systems, cell walls, etc. to the MTE framework is analogous to 280 
expanding the definition of planets to include not only trans-Neptunian objects but comets, 281 
asteroids, and moons as well. By expanding the category to include a grab-bag of unrelated items, 282 
we would sacrifice any semblance of theoretical unity. 283 
 284 
 The justification for most of the proposed additions is their outsized effects on the 285 
biosphere and on subsequent evolutionary processes. Importance, though, is a lousy criterion for 286 
grouping evolutionary processes. The MTE framework is a part of evolutionary theory in the same 287 
way that behavioral ecology, quantitative genetics, evo-devo, and inclusive fitness are parts of 288 
evolutionary theory. Each seeks to explain some aspect of biology and includes within its purview 289 
all of the relevant examples without regard for the magnitude of their effect. Behavioral ecology 290 
does not exclude behaviors unique to a single species, nor does evo-devo exclude monotreme 291 
development because monotremes have not experienced a large adaptive radiation. In each case, 292 
the fit of a particular process to a subfield is a matter of similarity to other processes in the same 293 
subfield, not of perceived importance.  294 
 295 
 Importance is a lousy criterion because it is based on outcomes, not on fundamental 296 
similarities. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's list was not intended to be a list of the most important 297 
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evolutionary changes (in spite of the title of their book). In fact, they specifically exclude 298 
consideration of such "major phenotypic changes" as terrestrialization and the origins of vision, 299 
flight, and homeothermy (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995). The framework that explains 300 
processes as diverse as the evolution of multicellularity, of nervous systems, and of cell walls 301 
might be best described as ‘evolutionary biology’; no smaller category will suffice. Aside from 302 
preventing theoretical unity, using importance as a criterion precludes consideration of recent or 303 
in-progress transitions, the eventual importance of which we can't yet evaluate. 304 
 305 
What to leave in 306 
Each polypus, though closely united to its brethren, has a distinct mouth, body, and 307 
tentacula. Of these polypi, in a large specimen, there must be many thousands; yet we see 308 
that they act by one movement; that they have one central axis connected with a system of 309 
obscure circulation; and that the ova are produced in an organ distinct from the separate 310 
individuals. Well may one be allowed to ask, what is an individual? (Darwin 1839, p. 117, 311 
referring to a colonial cnidarian sea pen). 312 
The second kind of change that will be needed to make the MTE framework approximate a natural 313 
kind is to include events and processes that meet the criteria of resulting in a new level of selection, 314 
but which have generally been ignored. Some such additions have already been suggested. For 315 
example, the endosymbiosis of a cyanobacterium that resulted in the primary acquisition of a 316 
chloroplast, and secondary and higher-order acquisitions of eukaryotic algae, are egalitarian 317 
transitions that parallel the endosymbiotic origin of mitochondria. Although they have been 318 
relatively neglected in the MTE literature, several authors have pointed out that they belong 319 
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(Keeling 2010; Bourke 2011; Erwin 2015; Szathmáry 2015; O’Malley and Powell 2016). The 320 
relatively recent domestication of a cyanobacterium by the filose amoeba Paulinella, which may 321 
represent a second origin of a primary chloroplast, has also been nominated for inclusion (Booth 322 
2014; Szathmáry 2015). 323 
 324 
 Other kinds of multispecies coalitions have also been proposed for inclusion in the MTE 325 
framework. Benjamin Kerr and Joshua Nahum, for example, argue that the association between 326 
corals and single-celled algae called zooxanthellae qualifies (Kerr and Nahum 2011). Andrew 327 
Bourke and Szathmáry both consider the origins of lichens as major transitions (Bourke 2011; 328 
Szathmáry 2015), and Szathmáry also includes the Buchnera-aphid symbiosis within his 'Major 329 
Transitions 2.0' (Szathmáry 2015). 330 
 331 
 Symbiotic associations occupy a spectrum of degrees of intimacy from casual to 332 
mitochondria. Which of these qualify as a composite individual, or holobiont, will undoubtedly 333 
differ among readers. Most would, I think, agree that free-living protists, with their bacterial and 334 
archaeal components, qualify; few would, I think, extend that to oxpeckers and wildebeest. In 335 
between, there is a range of associations that may or may not constitute major transitions. What I 336 
am advocating is a standard by which we can judge: does the association constitute a composite 337 
individual, in the sense of a unit of selection? If so, it should be included within the MTE 338 
framework. 339 
 340 
 Among the fraternal transitions, the most egregious oversight is the exclusion of colonial 341 
animals, such as colonial trematodes (Hechinger et al. 2011; Resetarits et al. 2020) and marine 342 
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invertebrates within the zoantharian and anthozoan corals, hydrozoans, bryozoans, graptolites, and 343 
ascidians. Many have differentiated zooids, some even with reproductive specialization, a striking 344 
parallel to differentiated cells in multicellular organisms. Buss hints that he does consider such 345 
'metameric organisms' to constitute a new level of selection (Buss 1987, p. 195), and Bourke argues 346 
explicitly for their inclusion (Bourke 2011). As with the putative egalitarian transitions discussed 347 
above, the question of whether or not a coral or graptolite colony is the outcome of a major 348 
transition hinges on whether or not it qualifies as an individual. The most integrated of these, for 349 
example Portuguese man o' war, certainly do. 350 
 351 
Let's talk about sex 352 
[S]ex requires the coordination of two individuals, and, so implies the existence of a 353 
higher-level unit, the reproductive pair...Though I argue that viewing sex as an ETI may 354 
help integrate different perspectives on the problem of the evolution of sex, there are 355 
several senses in which the evolution of sex is not an ETI in the same sense as, say, 356 
multicellularity.  (Michod 2011, p. 186) 357 
I have so far largely ignored one of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's (1995) transitions, that from 358 
asexual to sexual populations. Whether or not the origin of sex should be included within the MTE 359 
framework is a more difficult question than those I considered in the previous sections. The origins 360 
of the genetic code and of language are clearly not origins of new levels of selection. The origins 361 
of plastids and other endosymbionts, of lichens, and of colonial marine invertebrates clearly are. 362 
 363 
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 The evolution of eukaryotic sex was one of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's major 364 
transitions (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995). Michod generally includes it within his 365 
evolutionary transitions in individuality, though he admits that there are important differences 366 
between sex and other such transitions (Michod 2011, see quote above). Bourke also includes sex 367 
as a transition in individuality (Bourke 2011). On the other hand, Queller pointed out the poor fit 368 
of sex within the major transitions framework (Queller 1997), Szathmáry demoted it to an 369 
subprocess within the evolution of eukaryotes (Szathmáry 2015), and West and colleagues 370 
excluded it altogether (West et al. 2015).  371 
 372 
 The evolution of sex has some fundamental similarities to that of eukaryotes, 373 
multicellularity, and eusociality, but important differences from these processes as well. But 374 
viewing major transitions in the way I advocate gives us a grip on the question. Whether or not 375 
sex belongs in the major transitions framework should be decided on the same basis as other 376 
transitions: does it result in a new unit of selection?  377 
 378 
 My assessment is that in most cases, it does not. In the view I have outlined here, sex would 379 
be a major transition if the mated pair constitutes a unit of selection. Indeed, these are the grounds 380 
on which Michod (2011, p. 186) justifies viewing sex as an ETI: "...fitness is a property of the 381 
reproductive pair, not of individual organisms. In this sense, the reproductive pair is the real 382 
evolutionary individual in obligate sexual species."   383 
 384 
 It is true that the members of a mated pair often cooperate. But is the mated pair an 385 
evolutionary individual in the sense of a unit of selection? Each has its own genetic interest, namely 386 
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to increase the representation of the alleles it carries in future generations. These different interests 387 
cause conflicts, both intra- and interlocus, and in some cases these conflicts are so severe as to be 388 
fatal (Chapman et al. 2003). Often each partner has its own preference regarding how often and 389 
with whom the other mates, and arms races occur in an escalating contest to enforce (or escape 390 
enforcement of) these preferences (Chapman et al. 2003). Even in cases of strict genetic 391 
monogamy, each partner has a different optimal level of resource investment, which manifests as 392 
conflicts over such things as clutch size and parental care. 393 
 394 
 Perhaps the strongest argument against viewing the mated pair as a unit of selection is that 395 
the members' fitnesses are not generally the same. Although their fecundities are certainly linked, 396 
they are only likely to be equal in cases of strict genetic monogamy. Worse, their viabilities are, 397 
in most cases, quite independent, since the death of one does not imply the death of the other. 398 
 399 
 The best example supporting the view of sex as an MTE is probably cases of so-called 400 
"sexual parasites" as found in some anglerfish (Regan 1925). In such cases, the male may be a half 401 
million times smaller than the female, with whom he permanently fuses, eventually devolving to 402 
little more than a gonad. Even so, the male and female retain separate reproductive interests, as 403 
the female often multiply mates (Pietsch 2005), while the male would surely prefer an exclusive 404 
partnership in which he fertilizes all of the female's eggs. Thus, even in the best-case scenario, the 405 
mated pair is a poor candidate for individuality, undermining the case for including sex in the MTE 406 
framework. 407 
 408 
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The payoff: common themes 409 
There is sufficient formal similarity between the various transitions to hold out the hope 410 
that progress in understanding any one of them will help illuminate the others. (Szathmáry 411 
and Maynard Smith 1995, p. 23) 412 
Rocky planets are generally thought to form inside, and gas giants outside, the snow line (the 413 
distance from the central protostar at which water condensation becomes possible) (Kokubo and 414 
Ida 2002). Trans-Neptunian objects (including Pluto) do not fit this generalization, because they 415 
formed through fundamentally different processes (Lykawka and Mukai 2007). If current models 416 
of planetary formation are correct, we can expect to find exoplanets dominated by rocky planets 417 
inside, and gas giants outside, their systems' snow lines. A contrary finding would imply that 418 
planetary migration is common, that snow lines frequently move, or that current models are wrong 419 
(Ida and Lin 2005). By choosing objective criteria and applying them consistently, the IAU has 420 
made planets something like a natural kind, allowing such generalizations and increasing the utility 421 
of the category. 422 
 423 
 Similarly, if we define MTEs as something like a natural kind, we can hope to fulfill 424 
Szathmáry and Maynard Smith's vision (see quote above) by finding principles that apply across 425 
levels of organization, from chromosomes to societies. Some of these principles have already been 426 
inferred, for example that cooperation among the lower-level units plays an important role in the 427 
emergence of a higher-level individual (Michod et al. 2003; Michod and Herron 2006), that such 428 
transitions often lead to division of labor among the lower-level units (Maynard Smith and 429 
Szathmáry 1995; Michod 2007), and that the number of subunits correlates with other measures 430 
of complexity (Carmel and Shavit 2020). If these principles truly are general, we can expect that 431 
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they will hold wherever life exists. A contrary finding would force a revision of our models of 432 
major transitions, or at least a narrowing of their scope. 433 
 434 
 Defining MTEs this way allows us to ask questions about the processes and outcomes of 435 
major transitions that are not possible if those processes and outcomes are treated as criteria. Is 436 
cooperation among the lower-level units always necessary? Under what conditions do major 437 
transitions lead to division of labor? How consistently, and in what sense, do major transitions 438 
involve a change in the mechanism of inheritance?  439 
 440 
 By excluding criteria based on importance, we can also ask meaningful questions about the 441 
outcomes of major transitions. What are the factors that determine whether or not a major transition 442 
leads to a large adaptive radiation, or to biosphere-altering ecological effects? These questions are 443 
rendered meaningless if large adaptive radiations and biosphere-altering effects are qualifications 444 
for major transitions, just as using ‘has a biosphere' as a criterion for a celestial body to qualify as 445 
a planet would render meaningless questions about what kinds of planets can support life. We can 446 
only answer such questions by comparing transitions that have had these kinds of outcomes with 447 
those that have not.  448 
 449 
 Including 'minor' major transitions (to borrow Grosberg and Strathmann's (2007) 450 
terminology) also has the benefit of increasing sample size. In our search for trends and general 451 
principles, we now have access to a census (at least of known cases) instead of a biased sample. 452 
By examining similar processes, regardless of their outcomes, we can potentially learn about 453 
watershed transitions whose origins have been obscured by the eons, for example about the origins 454 
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of chloroplasts from subsequent endosymbioses between heterotrophs and photoautotrophs 455 
(Gavelis and Gile 2018; Husnik and Keeling 2019). What might we learn about intracellular 456 
symbioses by considering not only the origin of eukaryotes but of primary and higher-order 457 
plastids, insect endosymbionts (and endo-endosymbionts (Dohlen et al. 2001)), and algal cells that 458 
harbor Rickettsial bacteria (Kawafune et al. 2014)? What might we learn about clonal 459 
multicellularity from the spondylomoracean green alga Pyrobotrys (Nakada et al. 2010), colonial 460 
choanoflagellates (Fairclough et al. 2010), and multicellular ciliates such as Zoothamnium, or 461 
about societies from colonial trematodes, bryophytes, graptolites, and corals? 462 
 463 
Objections 464 
The question can justifiably be raised whether we have a theory or not. I think we do, but 465 
with qualifications. (Szathmáry 2015, p. 10110) 466 
Though they won't match the outcry over Pluto's exclusion, I expect that objections will be raised 467 
against the revision I have proposed. In this section, I will attempt to answer some that have already 468 
been raised and some that seem obvious. 469 
 470 
Fraternal and egalitarian transitions (Queller 1997) are fundamentally different processes. 471 
This is true, but they also have important characteristics in common, and historically both have 472 
been included in every version of the MTE framework (Table 1). Fraternal and egalitarian are 473 
useful subcategories within the larger category of major transitions, just as rocky and gas giant are 474 
useful subcategories within the larger category of planets. Both result in new levels of selection, 475 
and both contribute to our understanding of the origins of life's hierarchical organization. 476 
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 477 
Viewing MTEs as transitions in individuality still lumps unique, one-off transitions with 478 
repeated, somewhat predictable events (O’Malley and Powell 2016). This too is true: some 479 
major transitions, such as the origins of multicellularity, have happened many times, while others, 480 
such as the endosymbiotic origin of eukaryotes, are unique. I don’t see this as a problem. First of 481 
all, we don’t know which events are, as O’Malley and Powell put it, “non-replicable, one-off 482 
events” (O’Malley and Powell 2016, p. 163). The origin of eukaryotes is an obvious candidate, but 483 
we don’t actually know that, if it hadn't happened in the Lokiarchaeota, something like eukaryotes 484 
would not have arisen elsewhere in the tree of life. Even if some of the transitions truly are non-485 
replicable, though, this does not threaten the coherence of the category. Evolution, after all, is a 486 
combination of repeatable and contingent events. 487 
 488 
Limiting MTEs to transitions in individuality excludes many events of fundamental 489 
importance to evolutionary processes and to the biosphere (O’Malley and Powell 2016; Powell 490 
and O’Malley 2019). Furthermore, including all of the transitions that result in a new level of 491 
individuality would mean including some events that have not (yet) had major evolutionary 492 
consequences (O’Malley and Powell 2016). These are only disadvantages if we think important 493 
consequences should be one of the criteria. I have explained in the previous sections why I think 494 
importance is better treated as an outcome than as a criterion. Having major consequences is surely 495 
contingent, and we can’t say which recent transitions in individuality might have major 496 
consequences in the future. Furthermore, some events without major consequences have 497 
traditionally been included within the MTE framework, for example origins of multicellularity that 498 
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have not led to major adaptive radiations or biosphere-altering ecological impacts, such as the 499 
volvocine algae. 500 
 501 
Even in its revised form, the MTE framework remains progressivist, encouraging a ‘monads 502 
to man' view of evolution (O’Malley and Powell 2016; Powell and O’Malley 2019). If this is 503 
true, it is an argument about how we should interpret the MTE framework, not about how we 504 
should define it. There is nothing inherently progressivist in recognizing that in some lineages, at 505 
some times, complexity, in the sense of the number of hierarchically nested levels (McShea 1996, 506 
2001), has increased. This is simply true. As Maynard Smith and Száthmary put it, "...there is 507 
surely some sense in which elephants and oak trees are more complex than bacteria, and bacteria 508 
than the first replicating molecules” (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995, p. 23). A claim that 509 
such increases are universal or inevitable would be progressivist, but I am unfamiliar with any 510 
such claim in the peer-reviewed literature. Furthermore, in the view I advocate, humans occupy 511 
no privileged position, and the vast majority of MTEs—most endosymbiotic events, most origins 512 
of multicellularity, all origins of eusociality—did not lead to humans. If there is a ‘highest’ level 513 
(again, in terms of number of nested levels within), it would be that of quaking aspen groves, of 514 
eusocial insects and colonial marine invertebrates, of quaternary endosymbiosis-derived 515 
dinoflagellates, or possibly of ant ‘supercolonies’ (Giraud et al. 2002).   516 
 517 
Conclusions 518 
At the heart of my arguments is the simple observation that the history of life is a history 519 
of the elaboration of new self-replicating entities by the self-replicating entities contained 520 
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within them (or the incorporation of some self-replicating entities by others)...The history 521 
of life is a history of different units of selection. (Buss 1987, p. viii) 522 
I take the purpose of the major transitions framework to be explaining the hierarchical organization 523 
of life on Earth: societies made up of organisms, which are in turn made up of cells, cells within 524 
cells, and so on (Buss 1987; Michod 1999; Bourke 2011; Simpson 2011; Ågren 2014). Each level 525 
of the hierarchy, from chromosomes to superorganisms, has or is thought to have emerged from 526 
components that were previously evolutionary individuals in their own right. I advocate including 527 
within the major transitions framework all those, and only those, events and processes in which a 528 
new level of selection has emerged. Applying this criterion consistently would make the major 529 
transitions framework philosophically coherent, something like a natural kind. By including events 530 
and processes that have mostly been neglected, it would also increase the number of events from 531 
which we can draw inferences. 532 
 533 
 We do need a theoretical framework to explain other events of momentous consequence, 534 
such as the origin of the genetic code, the Cambrian explosion, the biotic oxygenation of Earth's 535 
atmosphere, and the origins of powered flight. Thankfully, such a framework exists. We could call 536 
it macroevolution, or simply evolutionary biology. No smaller category can hope to both explain 537 
such a wide variety of events and retain a semblance of coherence.  538 
 539 
 The course I advocate is a minimal intervention and much less invasive than other proposed 540 
treatments. Biologists and philosophers who write about the MTE framework, particularly those 541 
who seek general principles, have, by and large, already converged on something like the definition 542 
I advocate (e.g., Bonner 1974; McShea 2001; Bourke 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2011; Simpson 2011; 543 
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Ågren 2014; Clarke 2014; West et al. 2015; McShea 2016; Czégel et al. 2019; Carmel and Shavit 544 
2020). In some cases this has been explicit; in others the authors have simply ignored MTEs that 545 
do not result in new levels of selection. In fact, aside from their inclusion by Maynard Smith and 546 
Szathmary (1995), the origins of the genetic code and language have played virtually no role in 547 
the development of the MTE framework, probably because there is nothing to be gained by their 548 
inclusion. The impracticality of including fundamentally different processes has, in other words, 549 
already driven the field toward adopting a coherent category. Recent proposals to include 550 
additional unrelated processes would reverse this trend, radically redefining the MTE framework 551 
into something unrecognizable and less useful. 552 
 553 
 There is no equivalent of the IAU for evolutionary biology, no final authority to impose a 554 
definition on the field. Definitions are not right or wrong anyway, but more or less useful. I have 555 
argued for a particular definition of major transitions on the grounds that it closely approximates 556 
a natural kind, making it more useful than less coherent definitions. Having a clear criterion will 557 
allow us to objectively evaluate whether a particular process or event constitutes a major transition, 558 
and grouping like processes and events will allow us to identify trends and general principles that 559 
may be true for all. 560 
 561 
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